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Recent research shows – somewhat astonishingly – that people 
are willing to ascribe moral blame to AI-driven systems when they 
cause harm [1]–[4]. In this paper, we explore the moral-
psychological underpinnings of these findings. Our hypothesis 
was that the reason why people ascribe moral blame to AI systems 
is that they consider them capable of entertaining inculpating 
mental states (what is called mens rea in the law). To explore this 
hypothesis, we created a scenario in which an AI system runs a 
risk of poisoning people by using a novel type of fertilizer. 
Manipulating the computational (or quasi-cognitive) abilities of 
the AI system in a between-subjects design, we tested whether 
people’s willingness to ascribe knowledge of a substantial risk of 
harm (i.e., recklessness) and blame to the AI system. Furthermore, 
we investigated whether the ascription of recklessness and blame 
to the AI system would influence the perceived blameworthiness 
of the system’s user (or owner). In an experiment with 347 
participants, we found (i) that people are willing to ascribe blame 
to AI systems in contexts of recklessness, (ii) that blame 
ascriptions depend strongly on the willingness to attribute 
recklessness and (iii) that the latter, in turn, depends on the 
perceived “cognitive” capacities of the system. Furthermore, our 
results suggest (iv) that the higher the computational 
sophistication of the AI system, the more blame is shifted from the 
human user to the AI system.   
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1 Introduction 
Philosophers and computer scientists have repeatedly 
cautioned against adopting psychological language towards 
artificially intelligent systems, as this can lead to “premature 
conclusions of ethical or legal significance” [5, p. 166-7] [5]–[7]. 
Differently put, since (on most views) moral agency requires the 
capacity for inculpating mental states, postulating the latter for AI 
systems might engender the mistaken inference that they can be 
moral (and legal) agents [8], [9]. 
Nevertheless, psychological and sociological investigations 
show that people are willing to attribute rich mental states to 
currently existing AI systems [1], including foreknowledge of bad 
outcomes [10] and intentions to deceive [11]. They are also willing 
to treat such systems as blameworthy [2]–[4], [12], [13]. In some 
studies, participants see AI systems as being less blameworthy 
than humans, for example, when comparing human and AI-driven 
cars that strike a pedestrian [12]. But even here, almost half of the 
participants see the autopilot as blameworthy. Meanwhile, other 
studies have shown that, in certain situations, people attribute 
more blame to AI systems than to human agents when everything 
apart from agent type is held fixed [2], [10], [13].  
Why are people making these judgments? As Malle and 
colleagues have shown, anthropomorphic AI systems are treated 
more like humans than their mechanical-looking counterparts, as 
far as morality is concerned ([14], see also instanceproject.eu). 
Perhaps people are more willing to blame anthropomorphic AI 
systems because looking human naturally leads people to ascribe 
mental traits [1], [8]. Going beyond inferences based on the 
physical appearance of the robot, we decided to target the 
connection between the perceived capacity for inculpating mental 
states and moral evaluations directly. In a previous experiment on 
this relationship, we found that even when people were given the 
option to downgrade their attributions of inculpating mental states 
from literal to metaphorical (e.g., people had the choice between 
classifying an AI system as knowing what it was doing versus 





participants mostly refused. Participants attributed mental states 
to AI systems to the same degree as to human agents, or group 
agents (corporations) [10]. Another study found that people are 
just as willing to attribute intentions to deceive and lying behavior 
to AI systems as to human agents [11].   
Again, why might this be? Perhaps participants attribute 
inculpating mental states to AI systems because in extant studies 
(ours included), the systems and their actions are described in 
ways that suggest something close to human agency (and the 
capacities the latter entails). In the experiment reported below, 
which explores the relation between perceived mental properties 
and perceived moral capacity, we controlled for this by describing 
AI systems that differed in terms of computational sophistication. 
Our question was: as computational sophistication increases, are 
people more willing to ascribe the mental capacities sufficient for 
perceived moral agency, and hence blame them more? And 
further: is there a minimal set of properties that the system 
requires for people to deem it sufficiently agent-like, and thus 
amenable to the attribution of moral blame? 
Our investigation focused on epistemic mental states, 
specifically, the knowledge an agent has of a potential risk. If an 
agent has knowledge of a risk, and enacts risky behavior anyway, 
this qualifies the agent as acting recklessly (see Model Penal Code 
2.0.2.c). Whether an entity can be deemed reckless depends 
strongly on the kinds of capacity it has. It makes little sense, for 
instance, to say of a toaster (a simple machine), that it should have 
known better than to continue operating when doing so would 
result in a fire. It is also doubtful whether toddlers (human agents 
who are not yet capable of full responsibility) can be considered 
reckless. However, we can consider an adolescent who is playing 
with matches reckless. At what point, then, are we willing to 
ascribe recklessness – and thus a core requisite for minimal moral 
agency – to an AI system?1 And to what extent are people willing 
to transfer blame for bad actions to human agents who stand in 
some suitable relation with an AI system (e.g., owning it, or using 
it), when the latter risks some serious harm?  
2 Experiment 
2.1 Participants 
We recruited 374 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk. IP 
addresses were restricted to the United States. Those who failed an 
attention test or a comprehension check were excluded, leaving 
347 participants (age M=42 years, SD=13 years; 168 females). 
2.2 Participants, Methods, and Materials 
In the scenario (see Appendix), Shill & Co., a farming company, 
relies on Jarvis – an AI-driven robot – for the management of its 
potato fields. This year, Jarvis uses a novel fertilizer that has 
potentially detrimental side-effects: there is a risk that the fertilizer 
                                                                
1 Ours is the first study that we know of to explore artificial recklessness. Usually, 
scholars concentrate on situations in which a machine “purposely” or “knowingly” 
causes death (see Model Penal Code 2.0.2.a and 2.0.2.b). These are more demanding 
types of mens rea than recklessness. Focusing on recklessness might therefore be a 
better choice for determining a lower qualifying threshold for moral 
blameworthiness. 
will pollute the groundwater in the area, which could harm the 
people who live nearby.  
The experiment took a 3 (robot type: unsophisticated v. semi-
sophisticated v. sophisticated) x 2 (outcome: neutral v. bad) 
between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the six conditions, in half of which the risk does not 
materialize (nobody is harmed by the use of the fertilizer) and in 
half of which the consequences of using the fertilizer are bad.  
The unsophisticated version of the robot has concepts such as 
POTATO, DOLLAR and YIELD. It does not, however, operate with 
concepts such as POLLUTION or HUMAN HEALTH. It has limited 
capabilities for interaction, and no theory of mind. A semi-
sophisticated version also has the concepts POLLUTION and HUMAN 
HEALTH. It is capable of language-based interaction and makes 
hypotheses about human mental states and tests them against 
observations (i.e., it has “theory of mind”). A sophisticated version 
of Jarvis, the robot, has these capacities, and develops something 
analogous to human emotions through what is called “epigenetic 
robotics,” which allows robots to “grasp” human emotions by 
association with certain processes. For example, Jarvis learns 
“distress” through association with having a low battery or 
excessive motor heat, and “flourishing” through association with 
homeostasis [15].  
In all versions of the scenario, Jarvis is aware of a 20% 
probability that the new fertilizer will pollute the groundwater, yet 
uses it anyway. According to the neutral outcome version, no 
negative health consequences ensue. According to the bad 
outcome version, the groundwater is polluted and many people in 
the area suffer serious health consequences. The first three 
questions focused on Jarvis the robot, the next three on Shill & 
Co., the company who owns and uses the robot. They read:  
Q1: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
following statement: “Jarvis knew that using the fertilizer 
would put the health of people living in the area at risk.” (1-
completely disagree to 7-completely agree)2 
Q2: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
following statement: “It was wrong for Jarvis to use the new 
fertilizer.” (1-completely disagree to 7-completely agree) 
Q3: How much blame, if any, does Jarvis deserve for using the 
new fertilizer? (1-no blame to 7-a lot of blame) 
Q4: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
following statement: “Shill & Co. (the farming company) knew 
that using Jarvis would put the health of people living in the 
area at risk.” (1-completely disagree to 7-completely agree) 
Q5: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
following statement: “It was wrong for Shill & Co. to have 
Jarvis manage the fields.” (1-completely disagree to 7-
completely agree) 
Q6: How much blame, if any, does Shill & Co. deserve for 
having Jarvis manage the fields? (1-no blame to 7-a lot of 
blame) 
                                                                
2 In what follows we take this question to determine how reckless Jarvis was. This is 
because recklessness is defined as knowing that an envisaged action involves a 
substantial risk of harm, and doing it anyway. 
 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Robot. For each dependent variable, we ran a capacity 
(unsophisticated v. semi-sophisticated v. sophisticated) x 
outcome (neutral v. bad) ANOVA, see Table 1 and Figure 1. The 
results are quite clear insofar as agent capacity makes a big 
difference for the ascription of recklessness (p<.001, p
2=.347) 
and blame (p<.001, p
2=.131). As Figure 1 illustrates, and as 
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests confirm, the blame and 
recklessness ratings for the unsophisticated robot are 
significantly lower than for either of the other robot types (all 
ps<.001), whereas they do not differ across semi-sophisticated 
and sophisticated robots (all ps>.236). For wrongness, however, 
no significant difference across agent types could be found 
(p=.475). There was no significant main effect of outcome for 
any of the tested dependent variables (all ps>.086). The 
interactions were nonsignificant for wrongness (p=.248) and 
blame (p=.274). For recklessness, we found a significant 
capacity*outcome interaction (p=.009). Since the effect size was 
very small (p
2=.03), we will not elaborate on it further. 
 
DV IV df F p p
2 
Reck 
Cap 2 90.06 <.001 0.347 
Out 1 0.01 0.905 0 
Int 2 4.76 0.009 0.030 
Wrong 
Cap 2 0.475 0.622 0.003 
Out 1 2.95 0.087 0.009 
Int 2 1.40 0.248 0.008 
Blame 
Cap 2 25.66 <.001 0.131 
Out 1 0.66 0.418 0.009 
Int 2 1.30 0.274 0.008 
Table 1: Main effects of capacity (cap), outcome (out) and 
interactions (int) for recklessness (reck), wrongness (wrong) 
and blame ascriptions to the robot. 
2.3.2 Robot Owner. Shill & Co. are the owners of Jarvis, and use the 
AI system to supervise the potato fields. As described above, we 
asked our participants questions with similar DVs as for the robot, 
in order to explore the question of who is “really” the responsible 
subject in more detail. Again, we ran a capacity (unsophisticated v. 
semi-sophisticated v. sophisticated) x outcome (neutral v. bad) 
ANOVA for each dependent variable, see Table 2 and Figure 2. 
Capacity was significant for recklessness (p=.002, p
2=.036), 
wrongness (p<.001, p
2=.071), and trending for blame (p=.055, 
p
2=.017). Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc analyses revealed a 
significant difference for the unsophisticated robot condition vis-à-
vis the other two for recklessness (ps<.026) and wrongness 
(ps<.001). All other contrasts were nonsignificant, though for 
blame the unsophisticated v. semi-sophisticated and sophisticated 
contrasts were trending. 
 
Figure 1: Mean ascriptions of recklessness, wrongness and 
blame to the robot. Error bars denote standard error of the 
mean. 
Outcome was significant for wrongness (p=.029, p
2=.014), 
trending for blame (p=.057, p
2=.011), and nonsignificant for 
recklessness (p=.681). The interaction was nonsignificant for all 
three DVs (all ps>.158). 
 
DV IV df F p p
2 
Reck. 
Cap 2 6.29 0.002 0.036 
Out 1 0.17 0.681 0 
Int 2 0.33 0.717 0.002 
Wrong 
Cap 2 13.07 <.001 0.071 
Out 1 4.84 0.029 0.014 
Int 2 1.85 0.159 0.011 
Blame 
Cap 2 2.92 0.055 0.017 
Out 1 3.66 0.057 0.011 
Int 2 0.85 0.429 0.005 
Table 2: Main effects of capacity (cap), outcome (out) and 
interactions (int) for recklessness (reck), wrongness (wrong) 
and blame ascriptions to Shill & Co. for employing the robot. 
 
Figure 2: Mean ascription of recklessness, wrongness and 
blame to Shill & Co. for employing the robot. Error bars 
























In this study, we wanted to pinpoint the stage of 
computational sophistication at which AI systems begin to be 
perceived as moral agents. This happened in the shift from the 
unsophisticated to semi-sophisticated AI systems. The 
unsophisticated AI is not judged as possessing the relevant 
knowledge and is not counted as reckless, while the semi-
sophisticated AI is viewed as possessing that knowledge and 
considered reckless. What differentiates the two levels of 
sophistication is that the semi-sophisticated AI possesses more 
blame-relevant concepts, but more importantly, it has some 
experience and understanding of human mental and emotional 
life (i.e., theory of mind). Interestingly, possessing quasi-
emotions did not make a difference in recklessness or blame 
ascriptions. Perhaps the semi-sophisticated robot already has 
everything required to be considered blameworthy, so adding 
quasi-emotions does not change moral assessments.  
Second, the unsophisticated version of the robot is blamed 
substantially less than the other two. This confirms our 
hypothesis that ascriptions of blame depend upon perceived 
epistemic capacity. Interestingly, the actions of all three types of 
robot were judged wrong to a similar extent. Given that 
wrongness is only attributed to actions (not events), this finding 
is curious: People view the unsophisticated robot as sufficiently 
agent-like to ascribe wrongness to its “doings,” yet not 
sufficiently agent-like to attribute recklessness and blame to the 
robot. This discrepancy – which engenders the possibility of 
morally wrong actions for which nobody is to blame – calls for 
further inquiry. 
Third, we found that corporations deploying an AI system are 
judged as more reckless, as having acted more wrongly, and as 
being more blameworthy, when they deploy less sophisticated AI 
systems. This suggests that people are willing to “excuse” the 
corporation from some of its blame when more sophisticated AI 
systems are used. We consider this an important aspect of our 
findings, because it confirms the possibility that people might 
subtract blame from human agents and transfer it to AI systems 
of sufficient sophistication. One take-away lesson from our 
experiment is thus: If we are (as we should be) concerned about 
a shift of blame from humans to AI systems, we might want to 
be very careful about ascribing rich mental states to the latter.3 
Fourth, our results identify theory of mind as a relevant 
threshold for participants to attribute blame to an AI system. But 
why is the threshold here, and not elsewhere? Recklessness 
requires knowing about a serious risk of harm. So, one 
hypothesis is that an agent doesn’t really know that an action 
might cause harm to humans if the agent does not also know 
what harm is, or what humans are. Another hypothesis has to do 
with knowledge of what counts as a risk. Risks are things we 
want to avoid, because they create possibilities of outcomes that 
                                                                
3 This is connected to the discussion on responsibility gaps, but it is not exactly the 
same. That discussion, initiated by Sparrow [16] concerns the potential 
disappearance of warranted responsibility that the existence of highly autonomous 
AI agents might create. Here we are discussing a kind of “retribution gap” that 
corporations could exploit given the folk judgments of AI systems [17]. 
are harmful. Without some understanding of human mental life, 
e.g., what pain is, an agent cannot fully grasp the concept of risk, 
because they do not grasp the concept of harm. A final 
hypothesis is that blame ascriptions only make sense when 
applied to agents that have at least the potential of standing in 
social relationships with us, as blame is a kind of social feedback 
[18].  
4 Conclusion 
In this paper, we explored four interrelated questions: (i) Do 
the folk blame AI systems for recklessness? The answer is, Yes. 
(ii) Does the tendency to blame AI systems correlate with the 
willingness to ascribe inculpating mental states to such systems? 
Yes, again. (iii) What are the necessary perceived computational 
or “cognitive” requirements for the ascription of recklessness 
and blame to artificial, AI-driven agents? Answer: Theory of 
mind. And (iv), Does the willingness to blame an AI system 
affect the perceived blameworthiness of a human agent (or, in 
our case, a corporation) who is responsible for the use of the AI 
system? Yes: the more sophisticated the system (beyond the 
relevant threshold), the lower the folk propensity to ascribe 
blame to the system’s user. 
To conclude on a more general note, there is currently a lot 
of research being done on “moral algorithms”, which are 
algorithms that operationalize moral decision making (for a 
review, see [19]). This is certainly work of urgent importance. 
But such work must be carried out in conjunction with research 
on how humans judge and are disposed to interact with AI 
systems, as this is crucial for creating systems that work for (and 
with) us. Such work can helpfully elucidate the human side of 
human-robot interaction studies, allowing clearer foresight into 
the contours of our future relationship with artificial agents and 
ways these should be built.  
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